Georgia Loses War with Russia on Apkhazeti Territory
26 January, 2012

The authorities in Georgia met the elections with no enhanced political skill at all. The army was very weak as it was. The zeal for combat was heightened but military skills were frustratingly low. The system of management needed to be much better, saying nothing about the military equipment which used to be very limited in quantity and was completely paralyzed right at the start of the decisive combat.

GJ – As it is very well known, during the Russian-Georgian war on the Apkhazeti (Russian: Abkhazia) territory, a cease-fire agreement was signed which also included the clearing of the conflict zone from the military gear of the sides, but those agreements had been breached on regular basis, and it was the Russian side that broke them as a rule. Why was this happening?

S.M. – That’s what Russia is all about – she always behaves arbitrarily and against the accepted rules. The last agreement was breached in September of 1992, and the combats were reinstated to a full swing with direct and unabashed participation of the Russian military units. A forceful attack on Sokhumi was staged forthwith. The Russians put paratroopers in Gulripshi and Gali districts of Apkhazeti. At that moment something very weird had taken place – the tanks belonging to the Georgian side were left without the mechanism for putting them into a combat operation, which meant that all those Georgian-side tanks were crippled for combat. Just imagine how cunningly the Russian state security service was operating! There were other problems too. The communication between the Georgian military units was also damaged. The sky was completely occupied by the Russian air force. The Georgian aviation (scanty as it was) lost its chance to use its aviation. On top of everything, a new impetus and energy was given to the internal network of secret agents, all kinds of destructive forces and criminal formations – all of those having been operated and manipulated by the Russian special servicemen.

GJ – Everything ended in fall of Sokhumi (capital of Apkhazeti) on September the 27th of 1992. The bigger part of Apkhazeti (Abkhazia) was occupied by the Russian army.

S.M. – Well, in the first place it was not that quick and easy. Secondly, one of the biggest reasons for losing the war was that Georgia was totally unprepared for it.

GJ – And why was Georgia so unprepared?

S.M. – During the war, in October of 1992, after the fall of the Gamsakhurdia government, the first elections were held. The authorities in Georgia met the elections with no enhanced political skill at all. The army was very weak as it was. The zeal for combat was heightened but military skills were frustratingly low. The system of management needed to be much better, saying nothing about the military equipment which used to be very limited in quantity and was completely paralyzed right at the start of the decisive combat.

GJ – And the civil confrontation which took place during President Gamsakhurdia’s rule in Georgia also played a very negative role, didn’t it?

S.M. – In the first place, this confrontation was completely inspired by Russia. And I strongly believe that it played a decisive role in our defeat in the Russian-Georgian war on the Apkhazeti territory.